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TAKING NOTES IN SCHOOL (COMMITTEE): CYR V.
MADAWASKA, BLETHEN V. PORTLAND SCHOOL
COMMITTEE, AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 
Benjamin J. Tucker*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, decided Cyr
v. Madawaska School Department,1 and recently decided Blethen Maine Newspapers
Inc. v. Portland School Committee.2 These decisions will guide the actions and
behavior of municipal, school department, and elected officials in Maine, and will also
affect public access to information under Maine’s broad “right to know” law, the
Freedom of Access Act (FOAA).3  
In Cyr, a split court held that an investigative report commissioned by the
Madawaska School Department must be redacted to maintain the confidentiality of
information relating to the personal history, general character, or conduct of an
employee.4  Although the FOAA generally requires disclosure of public records,
certain information in the Madawaska investigative report was exempted under Maine
law.5  The Law Court vacated the Superior Court,6 which had ordered full disclosure
of the report.7  
In Blethen, the Law Court considered two aspects of the FOAA: first, the
provision allowing executive session for certain purposes to shield information from
public disclosure; and second, the scope of the definition of “public records.”8  The
Superior Court had found that the Portland School Committee had held a partially
illegal executive session; further found that certain documents used and created at the
session were public records; and finally, ordered the disclosure of the documents,
subject to redaction of confidential information.9 On appeal, the Law Court vacated the
Superior Court and found that the School Committee’s executive session was lawful,
and therefore the documents created for it, as well as notes taken during the session,
are not subject to public disclosure.10
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11. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 2, 916 A.2d at 968-69.
12. Beurmond Banville, Principal Resignation Furor Grows in County, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr.
29, 2005, at B4 (further explaining that the school committee member was “frustrated with school board
bickering and communication problems between the superintendent's office and the entire community”).
Superintendent Michaud eventually resigned in August 2005.  Beurmond Banville, Madawaska Man Seeks
Report of School Probe, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov. 29, 2005, at B3.
13. Banville, Principal Resignation Furor Grows in County, supra note 12; see also Cyr, 2007 ME
28, ¶ 2, 916 A.2d at 969.
14. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 3, 916 A.2d at 969.
15. Id. ¶ 4, 916 A.2d at 969.
16. Id. ¶ 4, 916 A.2d at 969; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6101(2)(B) (1993 & Supp. 2006-2007)
provides:
B. Except as provided in paragraph A, information in any form relating to an employee
or applicant for employment, or to the employee's immediate family, must be kept
This Note will examine Cyr and Blethen, as well as the statutory and case law
background of the FOAA.  The Note then explores the implications of these decisions
for municipal and school officials, and their attorneys.  The combined effect of these
decisions will affect the behavior of municipal and school board members and
employees statewide.  School committees and municipal councils are in need of
guidance from the Law Court regarding two key issues: (1) when they can enter
executive session (and what the remedy is for an improper executive session), and (2)
what the scope of “public records” is under Maine law.  This Note concludes that both
the Law Court and the Maine Legislature should clarify the scope of the FOAA in
order to avoid negative consequences for the conduct of municipal and school
business.
II.  CYR V. MADAWASKA SCHOOL COMMITTEE
A.  Background
In April 2005, Madawaska School Superintendent Danny Michaud decided not
to rehire a probationary teacher for the 2005-2006 school year.11  The decision,
combined with long-running controversy over the superintendent’s management style,
sparked a furor in the community and led to significant disruptions, including the
resignation of Madawaska Middle-High School Principal Conrad Cyr, the resignation
of School Committee member Pierette Soucy, and a student walkout.12  A meeting
among student government representatives, the principal, and the superintendent also
occurred; parents were excluded from this meeting, and police allegedly stood by to
escort away any parent who attempted to enter the superintendent’s office.13 After these
events, the Madawaska School Committee voted to hire Attorney Ervin Snyder to
investigate the controversy and “what, if any, role the school committee, administra-
tion, and others may have had in the events.”14  Snyder conducted extensive interviews
and issued a written report (the “Snyder Report”) to the school board, which was
released to the public in redacted form.15  Paul A. Cyr, an active Madawaska citizen
(no relation to Principal Cyr), requested a full, unredacted copy of the report.  The
Madawaska School Department denied Cyr’s request, claiming the redacted
information was confidential under title 20-A, section 6101(2)(B) of the Maine
Revised Statutes.16  Paul A. Cyr then appealed to the Superior Court, pursuant to the
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confidential if it relates to the following:
(1) All information, working papers and examinations used in the examination or
evaluation of all applicants for employment;
(2) Medical information of any kind, including information pertaining to diagnosis
or treatment of mental or emotional disorders;
(3) Performance evaluations, personal references and other reports and evaluations
reflecting on the quality or adequacy of the employee's work or general character
compiled and maintained for employment purposes;
(4) Credit information;
(5) Except as provided by subsection 1, the personal history, general character or
conduct of the employee or any member of the employee's immediate family;
(6) Complaints, charges of misconduct, replies to complaints and charges of
misconduct and memoranda and other materials pertaining to disciplinary
action;
(7) Social security number;
(8) The teacher action plan and support system documents and reports maintained
for certification purposes; and
(9) Criminal history record information obtained pursuant to section 6103.
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(1) (1989) provides:
1. Records.  If any body or agency or official, who has custody or control of any public
record, shall refuse permission to so inspect or copy or abstract a public record, this denial
shall be made by the body or agency or official in writing, stating the reason for the denial,
within 5 working days of the request for inspection by any person. Any person aggrieved by
denial may appeal therefrom, within 5 working days of the receipt of the written notice of
denial, to any Superior Court within the State. If a court, after a trial de novo, determines
such denial was not for just and proper cause, it shall enter an order for disclosure. Appeals
shall be privileged in respect to their assignment for trial over all other actions except writs
of habeas corpus and actions brought by the State against individuals. 
The Bangor Daily News also filed an appeal in Superior Court, but settled for the redacted version.
Beurmond Banville, School System in Violation of State Access Law, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24,
2006, at A1.
18. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 5, 916 A.2d at 969.
19. Id. ¶ 6, 916 A.2d at 969.
20. Id. ¶ 7, 916 A.2d at 969-70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3) (1989 & Supp 2007-2008)
provides:
3. Public records. The term “public records” means any written, printed or graphic matter
or any mechanical or electronic data compilation from which information can be obtained,
directly or after translation into a form susceptible of visual or aural comprehension, that is
in the possession or custody of an agency or public official of this State or any of its political
subdivisions, or is in the possession or custody of an association, the membership of which
is composed exclusively of one or more of any of these entities, and has been received or
prepared for use in connection with the transaction of public or governmental business or
contains information relating to the transaction of public or governmental business, except:
A.   Records that have been designated confidential by statute.
FOAA.17  The Superior Court held a hearing, reviewed the unredacted report in
camera, and then ordered the release of the unredacted report in full.18  The
Madawaska School Department then appealed to the Law Court. 
On appeal, the School Department argued that the redacted portions of the report
are exceptions to the FOAA disclosure requirement because they fall under at least one
of three subsections of the statute designating certain employment records con-
fidential.19  Opening its analysis, the court first found that the Snyder Report is a public
record as defined by the FOAA20 and noted that under the FOAA, any member of the
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21. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 7, 916 A.2d at 969-70; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408(1) (1989 & Supp
2007-2008) provides:
1. Right to inspect and copy.  Except as otherwise provided by statute, every person has the
right to inspect and copy any public record during the regular business hours of the agency
or official having custody of the public record within a reasonable period of time after
making a request to inspect or copy the public record.
22. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 9, 916 A.2d at 970.
23. Id. ¶¶ 9-11, 916 A.2d at 970-71.
24. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6101(2)(B)(5) (2008) provides: “(5) Except as provided by
subsection 1, the personal history, general character or conduct of the employee or any member of the
employee's immediate family.”
25. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 10, 916 A.2d at 970.
26. Id. ¶ 11, 916 A.2d at 970.
27. Id. ¶ 13, 916 A.2d at 971 (Calkins, J., dissenting).
28. Id. ¶ 18, 916 A.2d at 972.
29. Id. ¶ 16, 916 A.2d at 971 (highlighting that FOAA section 6101 applies only to employee records).
30. Id. ¶ 19, 916 A.2d at 972.
public may inspect and copy a public record, unless it is otherwise confidential by
another statute.21  The court then noted that under the legislature’s directive, the FOAA
“shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies,” and repeated the judicially-created corollary rule that any statutory excep-
tions must be strictly construed.22  The court then reviewed the Superior Court’s
decision de novo.23
On review, the Law Court agreed with the School Department that the redacted
portions of the Snyder Report are confidential under FOAA section 6101(2)(B)(5).24
The Court held that “[t]his subsection’s directive is clear: to protect school employees
from the public disclosure of their, or their family’s, general character, conduct, or
personal history.  The statute is unambiguous, thus rendering a legislative history
analysis unnecessary.”25  Therefore, the redacted portions of the Snyder Report cannot
be disclosed, with one exception: A subsection of the report containing recommenda-
tions to the school board should be disclosed because it did not relate to “the personal
history, general character, or conduct” of any employee.26
Justice Calkins dissented, joined by Justices Dana and Alexander, disagreeing with
the majority’s holding and statutory interpretation.  The dissent would have affirmed
the Superior Court order to disclose the full Snyder Report because the School
Department failed to prove that the report fell under a statutory exception.27  The
dissent emphasizes the general rule that the agency claiming a statutory exception to
the FOAA (here, the School Department) has the burden of proof, and that “[o]n its
face the Snyder Report does not appear to be an employee record.”28  FOAA section
6101, according to the dissent, “is not applicable to this case unless the School
Department demonstrates that the Snyder Report is an employee record.”29  The dissent
critiques the majority, arguing that 
[a] court cannot guess that, just because an investigative report describes actions of
school employees and officials, it is an employee record or intended to be kept as an
employee record.  If [it] were truly the type of record that the Department regards as
an employee record, it would not have been difficult for the Department to have
supplied evidence to that effect.30  
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31. 2006 ME 55, 896 A.2d 960.
32. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 20, 916 A.2d at 972.
33. S. Portland, 2006 ME 55, ¶¶ 6-7, 896 A.2d at 963-64 (finding that an internal investigation report
of a complaint against a city employee could not be disclosed because ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §
2702(1)(B)(5) (1996) mandates confidentiality for "[c]omplaints, charges or accusations of misconduct,
replies to those complaints, charges or accusations and any other information or materials that may result
in disciplinary action").
34. Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 20, 916 A.2d at 972.
35. Id. ¶ 12, 916 A.2d at 971.
Justice Calkins then distinguished the case South Portland Police Patrol Association
v. City of South Portland,31 relied on by the School Department.32
In South Portland, the Law Court ruled against disclosure of the City of South
Portland’s investigative report by the human resources director about a complaint
against a municipal employee.33  The dissent in Cyr argues that the South Portland fact
pattern is not analogous to the Snyder Report because the Madawaska School Board
was not investigating a particular employee, nor was the Snyder Report intended to
become part of any employee record.34  
Responding to the dissent’s argument that the Snyder Report was not an
“employee evaluation” covered by FOAA section 6101(2)(B), the majority opinion
noted that 
comments on the role, background, and performance of the two key members of the
school administration involved in this controversy are the exact material contemplated
by subsection 6101(2)(B).  The fact that the School Board sought an evaluation of the
employees’ performance through an outside source and not through an internal
employee evaluation does not make the report any less an employee evaluation.35
B.  Analysis of Cyr
In Cyr, the Law Court split on the issue of statutory interpretation: what is the
scope of the “employee record” exemption of FOAA section 6101?  The majority
characterized the Snyder Report as an “employee record,” thus exempting it by statute
from the FOAA disclosure requirement.  In contrast, the dissent asserted that the report
should not be characterized as an “employee record” absent further evidence by the
School Department, and should be fully disclosed.  Underlying the majority’s statutory
interpretation is the rationale that the personal privacy and reputation of certain
Madawaska School District employees outweighs the public interest in fully knowing
the results of a school board’s investigation into the actions of school administrators
on matters of great significance to the community.  The public interest in full
knowledge of government action (“right to know”) is partially expressed in the stated
purpose of the FOAA: 
The Legislature finds and declares that public proceedings exist to aid in the
conduct of the people’s business. It is the intent of the Legislature that their actions
be taken openly and that the records of their actions be open to public inspection and
their deliberations be conducted openly. . . . 
2009] TAKING NOTES IN SCHOOL 271
36. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1989).
37. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405 (Supp. 2007-2008) provides: 
Those bodies or agencies falling within this subchapter may hold executive sessions
subject to the following conditions.
1. Not to defeat purposes of subchapter. These sessions shall not be used to defeat
the purposes of this subchapter as stated in section 401.
2. Final approval of certain items prohibited. No ordinances, orders, rules,
resolutions, regulations, contracts, appointments or other official actions shall
be finally approved at executive sessions.
3. Procedure for calling of executive sessions.  Executive sessions may be called
only by a public, recorded vote of 3/5 of the members, present and voting, of
such bodies or agencies.
4. Motion contents.  A motion to go into executive session must indicate the
precise nature of the business of the executive session and include a citation of
one or more sources of statutory or other authority that permits an executive
session for that business. Failure to state all authorities justifying the executive
session does not constitute a violation of this subchapter if one or more of the
authorities are accurately cited in the motion. An inaccurate citation of authority
for an executive session does not violate this subchapter if valid authority that
permits the executive session exists and the failure to cite the valid authority was
inadvertent.
5. Matters not contained in motion prohibited. No other matters may be considered
in that particular executive session.
6. Permitted deliberation. Deliberations may be conducted in executive sessions on
the following matters and no others:
A. Discussion or consideration of the employment, appointment, assignment,
duties, promotion, demotion, compensation, evaluation, disciplining,
resignation or dismissal of an individual or group of public officials,
appointees or employees of the body or agency or the investigation or
hearing of charges or complaints against a person or persons subject to the
following conditions:
(1) An executive session may be held only if public discussion could be
reasonably expected to cause damage to the reputation or the
individual's right to privacy would be violated;
(2) Any person charged or investigated shall be permitted to be present
at an executive session if he so desires;
(3) Any person charged or investigated may request in writing that the
investigation or hearing of charges or complaints against him be
conducted in open session. A request, if made to the agency, must be
honored; and
(4) Any person bringing charges, complaints or allegations of
misconduct against the individual under discussion shall be
permitted to be present.
This paragraph does not apply to discussion of a budget or budget proposal; 
This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies as contained in the declaration of legislative intent.36
However, in enacting the FOAA, the Maine Legislature provided for exceptions to
disclosure, which indicated the legislature’s recognition that individuals’ reputational
and privacy interests must sometimes be balanced against the public’s right to know,
and may sometimes outweigh it.  The legislature also recognized the government’s
interest in efficiency (for example, in negotiating contracts).  First, the FOAA
authorizes government agencies to conduct executive sessions for specific purposes,37
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B. Discussion or consideration by a school board of suspension or expulsion
of a public school student or a student at a private school, the cost of
whose education is paid from public funds, provided that:
(1) The student and legal counsel and, if the student be a minor, the
student's parents or legal guardians shall be permitted to be present
at an executive session if the student, parents or guardians so desire.
C. Discussion or consideration of the condition, acquisition or the use of real
or personal property permanently attached to real property or interests
therein or disposition of publicly held property or economic development
only if premature disclosures of the information would prejudice the
competitive or bargaining position of the body or agency; 
D. Discussion of labor contracts and proposals and meetings between a public
agency and its negotiators. The parties must be named before the body or
agency may go into executive session. Negotiations between the
representatives of a public employer and public employees may be open to
the public if both parties agree to conduct negotiations in open sessions;
E. Consultations between a body or agency and its attorney concerning the
legal rights and duties of the body or agency, pending or contemplated
litigation, settlement offers and matters where the duties of the public
body's counsel to his client pursuant to the code of professional
responsibility clearly conflict with this subchapter or where premature
general public knowledge would clearly place the State, municipality or
other public agency or person at a substantial disadvantage. 
F. Discussions of information contained in records made, maintained or
received by a body or agency when access by the general public to those
records is prohibited by statute; 
G. Discussion or approval of the content of examinations administered by a
body or agency for licensing, permitting or employment purposes;
consultation between a body or agency and any entity that provides
examination services to that body or agency regarding the content of an
examination; and review of examinations with the person examined; and
H. Consultations between municipal officers and a code enforcement officer
representing the municipality pursuant to Title 30-A, section 4452,
subsection 1, paragraph C in the prosecution of an enforcement matter
pending in District Court when the consultation relates to that pending
enforcement matter. 
38. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3) (Supp. 2007-2008) (listing exceptions to the definition of
"public records") provides:
A. Records that have been designated confidential by statute; 
B. Records that would be within the scope of a privilege against discovery or use as
evidence recognized by the courts of this State in civil or criminal trials if the records
or inspection thereof were sought in the course of a court proceeding; 
C. Legislative papers and reports until signed and publicly distributed in accordance with
legislative rules, and records, working papers, drafts and interoffice and intraoffice
memoranda used or maintained by any Legislator, legislative agency or legislative
employee to prepare proposed Senate or House papers or reports for consideration by
the Legislature or any of its committees during the legislative session or sessions in
which the papers or reports are prepared or considered or to which the paper or report
is carried over; 
D. Material prepared for and used specifically and exclusively in preparation for
negotiations, including the development of bargaining proposals to be made and the
and second, the FOAA lists categories exempted from its definition of “public record”
in sections 402(3)(A)-(O).38  Subsection (A), “[r]ecords that have been designated
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analysis of proposals received, by a public employer in collective bargaining with its
employees and their designated representatives; 
E. Records, working papers, interoffice and intraoffice memoranda used by or prepared
for faculty and administrative committees of the Maine Maritime Academy, the Maine
Community College System and the University of Maine System. The provisions of
this paragraph do not apply to the boards of trustees and the committees and
subcommittees of those boards, which are referred to in subsection 2, paragraph B; 
F. Records that would be confidential if they were in the possession or custody of an
agency or public official of the State or any of its political or administrative
subdivisions are confidential if those records are in the possession of an association,
the membership of which is composed exclusively of one or more political or
administrative subdivisions of the State; of boards, commissions, agencies or
authorities of any such subdivisions; or of any combination of any of these entities;
G. Materials related to the development of positions on legislation or materials that are
related to insurance or insurance-like protection or services which are in the possession
of an association, the membership of which is composed exclusively of one or more
political or administrative subdivisions of the State; of boards, commissions, agencies
or authorities of any such subdivisions; or of any combination of any of these entities;
H. Medical records and reports of municipal ambulance and rescue units and other
emergency medical service units, except that such records and reports must be
available upon request to law enforcement officers investigating criminal conduct; 
I. Juvenile records and reports of municipal fire departments regarding the investigation
and family background of a juvenile fire setter; 
J. Working papers, including records, drafts and interoffice and intraoffice memoranda,
used or maintained by any advisory organization covered by subsection 2, paragraph
F, or any member or staff of that organization during the existence of the advisory
organization. Working papers are public records if distributed by a member or in a
public meeting of the advisory organization; 
K. Personally identifying information concerning minors that is obtained or maintained
by a municipality in providing recreational or nonmandatory educational programs or
services, if the municipality has enacted an ordinance that specifies the circumstances
in which the information will be withheld from disclosure. This paragraph does not
apply to records governed by Title 20-A, section 6001 and does not supersede Title 20-
A, section 6001-A; 
L. Records describing security plans, security procedures or risk assessments prepared
specifically for the purpose of preventing or preparing for acts of terrorism, but only
to the extent that release of information contained in the record could reasonably be
expected to jeopardize the physical safety of government personnel or the public.
Information contained in records covered by this paragraph may be disclosed to the
Legislature or, in the case of a political or administrative subdivision, to municipal
officials or board members under conditions that protect the information from further
disclosure. For purposes of this paragraph, "terrorism" means conduct that is designed
to cause serious bodily injury or substantial risk of bodily injury to multiple persons,
substantial damage to multiple structures whether occupied or unoccupied or
substantial physical damage sufficient to disrupt the normal functioning of a critical
infrastructure; 
M. Records or information describing the architecture, design, access authentication,
encryption or security of information technology infrastructure and systems. Records
or information covered by this paragraph may be disclosed to the Legislature or, in the
case of a political or administrative subdivision, to municipal officials or board
members under conditions that protect the information from further disclosure; 
N. Social security numbers in the possession of the Department of Inland Fisheries and
Wildlife; and 
O. Personal contact information concerning public employees, except when that
information is public pursuant to other law. For the purposes of this paragraph:
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(1) “Personal contact information” means home address, home telephone number,
home facsimile number, home e-mail address and personal cellular telephone
number and personal pager number; and
(2) “Public employee” means an employee of a governmental entity, as defined in
Title 14, section 8102, subsection 2, except that “public employee” does not
include elected officials. 
39. The legislature recognized this problem in 2005, amending the FOAA and charging the Right To
Know Advisory Committee with developing a website that lists FOAA laws as well as exceptions. Your
Right to Know: The Maine Freedom of Access Act, http://maine.gov/foaa/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).  
40. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, 871 A.2d 523 [hereinafter Blethen (2005)].
For an excellent analysis of the case, see Kenleigh Nicoletta, Case Note, Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc.
v. State: Balancing the Public's Right to Know Against the Privacy Rights of Victims of Sexual Abuse, 59
ME. L. REV. 235 (2007). 
41. Blethen (2005), 2005 ME 56, ¶ 40, 871 A.2d at 535-36.
42. Id. ¶ 10, 871 A.2d at 527 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 614(1)(C) (Supp. 2004-2005)).
43. Id. ¶ 32, 871 A.2d at 531-32.
44. Id. ¶ 25, 871 A.2d at 531-32.
45. Id. ¶ 41, 871 A.2d at 536 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).
46. Id. ¶ 32, 871 A.2d at 533 (majority opinion).
47. Id. ¶ 40, 871 A.2d at 535.
confidential by statute,” is the broadest exception, and unfortunately the text does not
cross-reference to other specific statutes (such as title 20-A, section 6101 discussed
above).39 
The court in Cyr simply fit the Snyder Report into a convenient and plausible
statutory exception, but it did not discuss the competing public and private interests.
And it also did not discuss the standards for reviewing disputed information in camera
to guide lower courts in the future.  In 2005, the Law Court in Blethen Maine
Newspapers v. Maine40 (Blethen (2005)) had recognized the need for balancing public
and private interests, and as in Cyr, the Law Court ordered the disclosure of public
records with confidential information redacted.  
In Blethen (2005), a divided court ruled that the public interest in understanding
the Attorney General’s investigation of sexual abuse allegations against deceased
Roman Catholic priests outweighed the privacy interests of the deceased priests and
their families.41  The State argued that the information was confidential under a
statutory exception to the FOAA, found in title 16, section 614(1)(C) of the Maine
Revised Statutes, which prevents disclosure of investigative records if there is a
“reasonable possibility that public disclosure [would] constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy,”42 but the Law Court disagreed.  The court identified the
public interest was in knowing “why the Attorney General exercised his discretion not
to pursue criminal prosecutions in connection with the sexual abuse allegations,”43 and
denied that deceased priests and their families had a protected privacy interest.44  The
court also rejected the adoption of the Federal Favish evidentiary requirement (favored
by concurring Chief Justice Saufley),45 which would require an allegation of
governmental wrongdoing in order to release investigatory records.46  The Attorney
General was ordered to release disclosure of the records, including the names of
deceased priests accused of sexual abuse, after redaction of the names and identifying
information of persons other than the deceased priests.47  The court held that the
“central purpose” of the FOAA is “ensuring the public’s right to hold the government
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48. Id. ¶ 32, 871 A.2d at 533.
49. Id. ¶ 14, 871 A.2d at 529.
50. Id. ¶¶ 51-69, 871 A.2d at 538-42 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
51. Id. ¶ 70 , 871 A.2d at 542 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
52. Id. ¶ 75 , 871 A.2d at 543.
53. Nicoletta, supra note 35, at 237.  She also predicted that “[t]he complexity of this issue is clear
from numerous opinions issued by the court in Blethen, and will undoubtedly continue to be so in the near
future as similar cases enter the courthouse.” Id. at 258.
accountable”48 and announced that its FOAA decision would be guided by a balancing
test:
The disclosure of investigative records is not permitted if the invasion of personal
privacy is determined to be unwarranted when weighed against the identified public
interest that will be served by disclosure.  Thus, we examine, in turn, (1) the personal
privacy interests of the alleged victims, witnesses, and deceased priests in maintaining
the confidentiality of the records sought by Blethen; (2) the public interest supporting
disclosure of the records; and (3) the balancing of the private and public interests.49
In dissent, Justice Clifford, joined by Justices Rudman and Alexander, invoked
public policy, legislative intent, and statutory interpretation to argue that the
investigative files should not be released: they would find that the balance would tip
the other way in favor of individual privacy interests on the facts of Blethen.50  Justice
Alexander filed an additional dissent to emphasize his objection to changing the
confidentiality standards of criminal investigations.51 Further, he pointed out that “[t]he
protections provided by a court-ordered redaction, focused on by the Court, are
illusory.”52
Although it used a balancing test in Blethen (2005), the court did not apply this
test in Cyr, but instead ruled on the narrow statutory interpretation of the explicit
exemption for employee records. Of course, Blethen (2005) applied to investigative
records held by the Attorney General, not employee records, but in light of its previous
holding in Blethen (2005), the court could have evaluated the privacy interests in Cyr.
Perhaps the court in Cyr is backing off its broad holding in Blethen (2005) because it
would prefer to avoid the complicated balancing of privacy interests against the
public’s interest in full knowledge of government decision-making. Perhaps a majority
saw the employee record statutory provision in FOAA section 6101 as a slam-dunk that
required no explanation.
However, after Blethen (2005) and Cyr, the question of redaction standards was
left hanging.  As one student commentator has observed, “the court failed to craft a
redaction standard that would adequately ensure, in future cases, that any personal
privacy interests of those named in such records would be protected from unwarranted
public disclosure.”53  
III.  BLETHEN MAINE NEWSPAPERS V. PORTLAND SCHOOL COMMITTEE 
A.  Background
On July 25, 2007, the Portland School Committee held an executive session in
order to, according to its agenda, “consult with counsel and consider the duties of
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central office staff with respect to the department’s financial management.”54 The
executive session occurred in the context of a controversial $2.5 million budget deficit
for the Portland School Department.55  The executive session produced four
documents: (1) the “Superintendent’s Outline,” explaining the Superintendent’s
management style; (2) the personal notes of School Committee member Ellen Alcorn;
(3) the personal notes of School Committee member Lori Gramlich; and (4) the notes
of the School Committee’s attorney.56   The Portland School Committee contended that
the executive session was pursuant to FOAA section 405, because the discussions were
about the “duties” and “job performance” of employees, as permitted under section
405(6)(A).57   In addition the Committee argued that “public discussion could be
reasonably expected to cause damage to one’s reputation or privacy interests,”
invoking the condition of subsection 405(6)(A)(1).58  The School Committee contends
that the executive session was not a discussion of “a budget or budget proposal,” which
would be prohibited by FOAA section 405(6).59  
On July 26, 2007, one day after the executive session, the Portland Press Herald
(owned by plaintiff Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc.) requested all records regarding
the executive session.60  The School Committee denied the newspaper’s request a few
days later, but provided a written description of the notes taken at the session.61
Meanwhile, the finance director of the Portland School Department resigned.62 Further,
on July 27, School Committee Member Benjamin Meiklejohn posted a comment on
the Portland Press website expressing skepticism about the use of executive sessions.63
The Portland Press Herald filed a complaint with the Superior Court on July 31 seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief as well as access to public records.64
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B.  Analysis
The major legal issue relating to the executive session is whether it was a
discussion of employee “duties,” as the School Committee argues, or a discussion of
“a budget,” as the newspaper argues.  After a hearing including testimony from those
present at the session, and in camera review of the documents, the Superior Court
agreed with the newspaper, and found that portions of the executive session were
improper under the FOAA.65  The court found that the following documents were
public records and must be released in full: (1) the “Superintendent’s Outline,” (2)
Alcorn’s notes, and (3) Gramlich’s notes.66  The notes of the attorney, however, were
redacted, to protect information privileged under FOAA section 405(6)(A) and (E) and
section 402(3)(B).67
On appeal to the Law Court, the Portland School Committee (PSC) argued that the
Superior Court erred in finding parts of the July 25 executive session unlawful, and
erred in finding the documents were public records.68  According to the PSC, the July
25, 2007, executive session was held “in order to permit [the PSC] to examine the roles
certain key central office staff had in the development and maintenance of its budget
and assess whether those individuals had adequately performed those roles.”69  Due to
the public controversy surrounding the school system budget problems, “such a
discussion could reasonably be expected to damage the reputation of one or more of
the staff members involved.”70  The PSC contended that its executive session was not
only permitted, but it was carefully planned in consultation with its legal counsel.71
PSC Chair John Coyne requested assistance from legal counsel for two purposes: “One
was to talk to senior staff and get a better sense of what their duties were with respect
to financial management and whether they performed those duties, and the second was
to be able to ask [legal counsel] legal questions they might have,” according to the
testimony of the attorney.72  He further testified that he advised the PSC that an
executive session for those purposes was legal, but he also warned Chair Coyne that
“folks should understand very clearly that this was not an executive session to discuss
the budget, solution to the budget, et cetera.”73  When the PSC met on July 25, it listed
the executive session as the first item on its agenda.74 
In discussions on the motion to go into executive session, concerns were raised by
citizens at the meeting, as well as one committee member.75  The attorney then
explained that the purpose of the session was to “discuss personnel issues and ask for
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legal advice,” and not to discuss the budget.76  The PSC then voted unanimously to
move into executive session.
The individuals present at the executive session were: eight members of the PSC
(three of whom arrived late after it had convened), the PSC’s legal counsel, Superin-
tendent Mary Jo O’Connor, Finance Director Richard Paulson, and Director of Human
Resources Joline Hart.77  According to the PSC, the attorney first explained the
purposes and limitations of the executive session, then Superintendent O’Connor
distributed her “Superintendent’s Outline” and gave a presentation on her management
philosophy.78  The PSC contended that the Outline was “prepared solely for the
Executive Session and was not provided to anyone outside of it.”79  Then committee
members questioned the staff in attendance, but the PSC contended that “[t]he topic
being addressed . . . was not the budget.”80  The PSC contended that “[a]t no time
during the meeting was there any discussion of any budget proposal, . . . the status of
the School Committee’s budget, . . . potential reductions to the budget, . . . how to
recoup expenditures, . . . how to prevent a recurrence of the budget problem, . . . or
how anyone might fix the problem.”81
The PSC’s central legal argument was that the executive session was about
personnel duties in the context of a budget crisis, not about the budget itself: “although
the . . . budget shortfall certainly provided the impetus for the Executive Session, . . .
finances were only discussed insofar as they provided a context for the personnel issues
being addressed.”82  PSC counsel called this the “crux” of the issue at oral argument.83
The PSC distinguished and emphasized the discussion of the employee “duties”
because Maine law prohibits “discussion of a budget or budget proposal” during
executive session.84  The PSC argued that public discussion of the duties of the
Superintendent and the Finance Director met the condition of section 405(6)(A), and
executive session was proper, in that such discussion “could be reasonably expected
to cause damage to the reputation” of the employees.85  To bolster its contention that
there was no “discussion” of the “budget”, the PSC parsed out the meanings of those
words on appeal.86
The PSC argued that although the FOAA did not define “discussion,” “budget,”
or “budget proposal,” the Superior Court erroneously interpreted those words broadly
to mean any discussion related to the budget.87  The PSC contended that a reading of
section 405(6)(A) in full demonstrates legislative intent to require a public proceeding
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“when the public body enters into a debate concerning the specifics of its budget or a
budget proposal—even if that discussion is related in some way to personnel issues.”88
The intent was not meant to operate in the other direction, that is, to force a public
discussion on personnel duties merely because those duties involved the budget.89  The
PSC argued that “the plain language of Section 405(6)(A) of the Act compels the
conclusion that a public body may discuss personnel or performance matters about
specific public employees—even where those matters relate to financial
issues—without the discussion turning into one about the public body’s ‘budget.’”90
The PSC contended that the evidentiary record, primarily witness testimony and legal
counsel’s notes, demonstrated that the “sole focus” and “sole topic” of  “discussion”
at the July 25 executive session was the job performance of the PSC’s employees.91
In addition, the PSC argued that the legislative history shows that the Legislature did
not intend to “provide a broad ban on the discussion of any topic remotely related to
a budget,” but was focused on prohibiting the practice of using executive session to
discuss the elimination of particular job positions.92
The PSC further argued that the Law Court’s interpretation of section 405(6)(A)
must be informed by its decision in Cyr v. Madawaska, which stands for the
proposition that documents relating to the role, background, and performance of school
administrators must remain confidential.93  In Cyr, the court interpreted title 20-A,
section 6101 of the Maine Revised Statutes to shield such records.94  The PSC argued
that together, these two sections are part of a statutory scheme to keep such information
confidential, and that “[i]t would be nonsensical” for documents to remain privileged,
but not oral communications about the same issue.95  The PSC argued that the statutory
scheme is intended to balance “an employee’s right to privacy in delicate personnel
matters on the one hand, and the public’s right to know about development of, and
revisions to, a public entity’s budget on the other.”96  Citing South Portland, the PSC
stated that a broad construction of the “budget discussion” prohibition would “swallow
the clear rule and undermine the Legislature’s intent to protect public employees from
the prejudice that would be caused if damaging accusations that were later determined
to be unfounded were aired in public.”97 
Portland Press Herald (the “Newspaper”) argued that discussing the duties of
employees relating to finances is equivalent to discussing the budget, prohibited by
section 405(6)(A), and that such discussion therefore invalidated the executive session,
making all the documents public records.98  At oral argument, counsel for the
newspaper described the “analytical tree” of section 405(6)(A) to allow a discussion
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of personnel duties only if there is a reasonable likelihood of damage to reputation, and
there is no discussion of the budget.99
The Newspaper argued that the Superior Court properly found that the July 25
executive session was unlawful.100  The factual determination by the Superior Court
that there were improper budgetary deliberations cannot be reviewed de novo, but only
for clear error.101  The Newspaper pointed out that not only did the Superior Court
evaluate testimonial evidence, but also reviewed, in camera, the notes taken by
committee members and legal counsel.  These documents remained under seal, and
thus were never provided to the Newspaper, but the Newspaper suggested that they
may provide additional support to the Superior Court’s finding.102  The Newspaper
contended that the testimony of legal counsel, Superintendent O’Connor, and
Committee member Meiklejohn supports the Superior Court’s finding that there was
discussion of the budget.103  The Newspaper also contended that the PSC argued for
a “narrow and technical definition of . . . budget, . . . inconsistent with the purposes of
the FOAA.”104
The Newspaper argued that the PSC’s attempt to characterize the executive
session as a personnel discussion, not a budget discussion, is flawed because the
session was in fact both: “[t]he two subjects are not mutually exclusive, and in this case
they overlapped.”105  If they overlap, the prohibition on budget discussions should
control.  The statutory “budget discussion” prohibition, the Newspaper pointed out, is
“appended to, and thus modifies, the exception to the overarching open meeting
requirement that permits executive sessions on certain personnel matters.”106
Therefore, according to the Newspaper, the most logical interpretation of section
405(6)(A) is that “the Legislature intended the budget provision to modify, and thus
trump, the personnel matters exception.”107  Discussions of the budget problem should
not be shielded from the public by characterizing them as discussions of duties of the
personnel responsible for the budget.108  The Newspaper suggested as an alternative
ground for affirming the Superior Court that “disclosure would not have been
damaging to the reputation of the employees.”109
A statutory requirement for executive session discussion of personnel duties is the
reasonable expectation of damage to reputation or privacy.110  The Newspaper argued
that the PSC had no “objectively reasonable expectation that personnel matters
discussed in the Executive Session would cause damage to anyone’s reputation” and
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a “subjective fear of harm” would not be enough.111  According to the Newspaper,
“there was no evidence before the Superior Court that the job performance issues
discussed in the Executive Session involved anything other than ‘honest
mistake[s].’”112  Further, a public official cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy about the performance of public duties such as budget management.113
The PSC countered with the fact that the Finance Director resigned after the
executive session.114  The reasonable expectation of reputational damage from a
discussion of possible “misfeasance or malfeasance” was “obvious” and borne out by
events.115  On July 25, the committee discussed not “a mere arithmetic error,” but the
performance of its own employees: “if the discussion showed a failure in job
performance (or worse yet that staff had made misrepresentations to the School
Committee) that person’s reputation would have been damaged.”116
The Superior Court held that the documents associated with the July 25 session
are public records and must be released.117  These documents included the notes taken
by individual PSC members at the meeting.118  The Newspaper argued that this was
correct because the FOAA definition of “public record” is expansive, and has been
construed broadly by the Law Court.119  The Superior Court was correct, the
Newspaper argued, because notes taken by PSC members meet the plain language
definition under section 402(3): they are “written” material and they were “prepared
for use in connection with . . . public or governmental business.”120  The Newspaper
contended that only a statutory amendment could create an exemption for personal
notes, and that the Law Court must affirm the Superior Court under the current
FOAA.121  Although the Law Court has not previously ruled on the public record status
of personal notes from an executive session, the Newspaper cited a 1992 decision by
Justice Lipez in Maine Superior Court that ordered the release of notes held by
Portland city officials regarding an illegal executive session. 122  The Newspaper urged
the Law Court to adopt the same logic and require the disclosure of the PSC members’
notes.123  The PSC replied that Justice Lipez in Guy Gannett ordered the disclosure of
only those portions of notes created during the illegal part of an executive session, not
the notes reflecting the legal portion.124  The PSC agreed that portions of notes from
an unlawful executive session should indeed be disclosed, but that “[t]o the extent the
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Court finds that the Executive Session was lawful, notes relating to that session are not
‘public records.’”125
In a 1984 case, Wiggins v. McDevitt, the Law Court had ordered the release of a
public official’s private tax return because it contained information related to the
transaction of public business. 126  The Newspaper argued that the PSC members’ notes
are analogous to the tax return in Wiggins.127  The PSC argued that the personal notes
are not analogous to the Wiggins tax return because the notes are “personal”: they do
not relate to the transaction of public business.128  The PSC argued that the Law Court
should be guided by the federal judiciary’s construction of the Federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).129  However, the Newspaper observed that the federal FOIA
does not define public records, as the Maine FOAA does, and federal courts have
defined public records more restrictively than Maine’s statutory definition. 130  Due to
the apparent legislative objective to define public records in a broad manner, the
Newspaper argued Maine courts are not free to construe exceptions to the FOAA
defining the term in a more restrictive manner akin to the federal definition.131  The
Newspaper also dismissed the PSC’s analysis of other state authorities because their
right-to-know statutes are unlike Maine’s.132  Then the Newspaper turned to the issue
of the attorney notes taken on July 25.
The Newspaper argued that the attorney’s notes must be disclosed, subject to
redaction of privileged information under FOAA section 402(3)(B), because they were
not protected by the work product doctrine.133  The Law Court held in 2000134 that a
party seeking to block disclosure must demonstrate: (1) a “subjective anticipation of
future litigation,” and (2) that the anticipation was “objectively reasonable.”135  The
Newspaper argued that the PSC did not meet its burden of proof, and that the July 25
session had “nothing to do with any actual or potential litigation.”136  The participation
of an attorney in a meeting should not be used to subvert the purpose of the FOAA, the
Newspaper urged.137  The PSC replied that the Portland Press Herald had threatened
to sue the School Committee, an actual threat of a lawsuit which should trigger the
work product doctrine protecting its attorney’s notes.138  
Finally, the Newspaper urged the court not to create any exemptions to the FOAA,
and suggests that it “require or encourage the creation of recordings or transcripts of
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executive sessions to facilitate judicial review.”139  The Committee urged the Law
Court to vacate the Superior Court decision and protect the confidentiality of the PSC’s
discussions on July 25, and give “guidance” to school committees and their
attorneys.140 
V.  CONCLUSION: TOO MUCH SECRECY?
The Law Court had an opportunity in Blethen v. Portland School Committee to
clarify two aspects of the FOAA: (1) when a public body may enter into executive
session, and (2) what constitutes public records.  Cyr v. Madawaska told school boards
that they may be able to redact information from public records relating to employee’s
job performance, but it did not establish standards by which redaction should occur.
However, in its recent Blethen decision, the Law Court did not touch on the issue of
redaction standards because it ultimately vacated the Superior Court and decided in
Blethen that the Portland School Committee’s executive session was lawful, and that
the documents and notes are not open to the public at all.141  In its unanimous decision,
the Law Court issued a sweeping new rule: documents produced exclusively for a
lawful executive session, and notes made during such a session, are not public records
and are not open to public inspection.142  The Court acknowledged that “[n]either the
definition of ‘public records’ nor the exception for executive sessions address the
treatment of documents prepared for or notes taken in connection with a legal
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executive sessions [sic.],”143 but justified the new rule by asserting that “[t]o hold
otherwise would produce an absurd and illogical result.”144 
The Law Court, without any further discussion, has thus created a shield for
documents prepared for or during lawful executive sessions.  Presumably, documents
from an unlawful executive session would be public records, but documents from a
partially unlawful session would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as in Guy
Gannett and Wiggins.  The Blethen court did decide that a school committee can
properly discuss the performance of its employees relating to financial matters such as
budget deficits, notwithstanding the prohibition on discussions of the budget under
section 405(6)(A).145  And while the Law Court decided that personal notes taken by
school committee members during a lawful executive session are not public records,
the court did not discuss whether personal notes qualify as public records under any
situation. 
The Law Court had announced a balancing test in Blethen (2005) that would
weigh the public interest in acquiring information against the privacy interests of those
about whom information would be disclosed.  After Blethen (2005) and Cyr, the names
of deceased priests accused of sexual abuse that appear in Attorney General
investigatory records are not protected, but a report created for a school board about
the conduct of a school superintendent carrying out his public duties is redacted to
protect his privacy.  One would expect the court to have found that the privacy interests
of the priests, who were never formally charged with any crimes, would deserve
protection, whereas the privacy of a school superintendent making decisions about how
to run a public school system would not.  In both cases, a shift of one vote on the court
would have tipped the outcome the other way.
Whatever the logic of the balancing test outcomes in Blethen (2005) and Cyr, the
same balancing test should have been applied in deciding Blethen to reach a different
outcome.  The public interest in understanding the reasons for Portland’s $2.5 million
school budget deficit was strong.  Once financial mismanagement of such magnitude
came to light, the school committee should have discussed the job performance of its
Superintendent and Financial Officer publicly, and required public testimony by the
officers.  Financial and management problems of that nature cannot be severed from
budget discussions, however hypertechnically defined.  The language and structure of
FOAA section 405(6)(A) indicate that the Maine Legislature considered financial
management of municipal and school budgets too important to be discussed in secret.
Documents produced by school or municipal management officials for such
discussions do not seem to have the weight of personal privacy interests attached to
them.  Further, the Maine Legislature included in the FOAA a liberal rule of
construction in section 401,146 whose spirit conflicts with the court’s new automatic
shield for documents prepared for executive session.147  
2009] TAKING NOTES IN SCHOOL 285
In conclusion, the Law Court has significantly limited the scope of the FOAA by
explicitly shielding executive session records from public view.  Shielding all records
produced for, or during, executive sessions is a dramatic decision which may alter the
behavior of municipal bodies in significant ways.  The unanimous decision is a strong
endorsement of secrecy in local government.  It remains to be seen whether this broad
new exemption from the FOAA will improve the quality of local government
decisions, or will simply decrease public access to the decisions of their representa-
tives, perhaps undermining Maine’s tradition of open and transparent government.
